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Abstract 
 
The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (PFTZ) is the first free trade zone of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). It seeks to reform the national economy and open it up to foreign 
investment. This article argues that the suite of legal instruments that establish the PFTZ – the 
Framework Plan, the Negative List, the Decision, and the Management Method – are legally 
uncertain and that their legal uncertainty could cause disputes between PFTZ investors and the 
PRC. To address the problem of legal uncertainty, the article proposes, first, the adoption of a 
rational connection to the PFTZ as the test for jurisdiction of the PFTZ Court and the PFTZ Court 
of Arbitration; secondly, the enactment of the Negative List and the Decision as laws in order to 
clarify their legal status; and, thirdly, a reform of the PFTZ dispute settlement mechanism under the 
Management Method into an arbitral system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (PFTZ) is one of the biggest steps towards economic 
reform that the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken in recent years. It 
builds on the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) set up by the State Council in the 1980s. The SEZs in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan1 aim to attract ‘foreign investment, advanced 
technology, managerial expertise and to increase employment’.2 To achieve these aims, SEZs offer 
different incentives, such as the removal of tariffs on imported goods for re-export 3  and the 
reduction of corporate profits tax on joint ventures from 33 per cent to 15 per cent.4 The aims of the 
PFTZ, however, are much more ambitious: the PRC government envisions it as a testing ground for                                                         
* Gonzalo Villalta Puig is Head of the School of Law and Politics and Professor of Law at The University of Hull, 
where he holds the established Chair in the Law of Economic Integration. Professor Villalta Puig is an Overseas Fellow 
of the Australian Academy of Law and a Fellow of the European Law Institute. He is chair of the Research Group for 
Constitutional Studies of Free Trade and Political Economy of the International Association of Constitutional Law and 
a member of the Committee on the Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals and the former Committee on 
International Trade Law and Study Group on Preferential Trade Agreements of the International Law Association. 
Professor Villalta Puig is a member of the Full Council of the International Law Association. He is Associate Editor of 
the Global Journal of Comparative Law (Brill Nijhoff). Professor Villalta Puig is Outstanding Fellow of the Faculty of 
Law at The Chinese University of Hong Kong.  ** Sabrina Leung Tsam Tai is a Trainee Solicitor with Eversheds Sutherland (Hong Kong). She writes in a personal 
capacity. 
1 Hu Jiaxiang, ‘Shanghai Free Trade Pilot Zone, The Model for Future China?’ Working Paper Series No 35 (Asian 
Law Institute, 2014) 3. 
2 Anne Fenwick, ‘Evaluating Chins’ Special Economic Zones’ (1984) 2(2) Berkeley JIL 377. 
3 Giovanni Palmioli & Adam Heal, ‘Structural Economic Reform in China: The Role of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone’ 
(2014) 3 Economic and Social Communication for Asia and the Pacific 4. 
4 Fenwick (n 2) 383. 
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innovative economic policies and reforms which, depending on their performance, may eventually 
be implemented nationally to liberalise domestic trade and investment.  
 
The PFTZ operates as an exemption from certain PRC market access and customs rules. Unlike free 
trade zones operating in jurisdictions such as the United Arab Emirates – where the various free 
zones of Dubai and Abu Dhabi each come under a completely new regime – the PFTZ remains 
subject to the overall authority of the PRC government, which sets the requisite ‘national 
strategies’.5 The close relationship between the PFTZ and the PRC government extends to the 
subnational level. The PFTZ Management Committee, which administers the management of the 
PFTZ, serves as the agent6 of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government in coordinating and 
managing the operation of the PFTZ.  
 
Through the use of a negative list approach, a simplified business registration system, loosened 
control over offshore financing activities, and enhanced Renminbi (RMB) convertibility, the PRC 
government aims to simplify administrative procedures and create a favourable business 
environment in the PFTZ. The business opportunities and commercial efficiency brought by these 
policies are convincing more and more multinational companies that the PFTZ is the ideal pad from 
which to launch their products for the PRC.7 More than 30,000 companies have already been set up 
inside the PFTZ since its establishment in 2013.8 This early success has encouraged the PRC 
government to extend many of its policies for the PFTZ beyond the PFTZ. In December 2014, the 
State Council issued a notice 9 giving national application to selected policies previously only 
applied inside the PFTZ. In November 2016, the State Council issued another notice giving national 
application to 19 additional PFTZ policies.10 
 
Given the experimental nature of the PFTZ, its policies are inevitably novel. That novelty, whilst 
attractive, can also cause investors to worry. The Framework Plan, 11 the Negative List, 12 the 
Decision13 and the Management Method14 are four key legal instruments under which innovative                                                         
5  State Council, ‘ 国 务 院 关 于 印 发 中 国 （ 上 海 ） 
自由贸易试验区总体方案的通知 [No 38] (Framework Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone)’ (27 
September 2013). 
6 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, ‘中国（上海）自由贸易试验区管理办法 [No 7] (Management Method 
of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone)’ (9 September 2013). 
7 Xinhua, ‘Xinhua Insight: China’s Free Trade Zones Pilot Reforms for Efficiency and Openness’ (Xinhuanet.com, 21 
April 2016) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/21/c_135301365.htm> accessed 30 January 2017. 
8 Korean International Trade Association, ‘Pilot Free Trade Zones Are Popular as Investment Destination in China’ 
(2016) <http://kita.org/about/newsView.do?id=&no=1927&searchWrd=&result_url=> accessed 30 January 2017. 
9 State Council, ‘国务院关于推广中国(上海)自由贸易试验区可复制改革试点经验的通知 [No 65] (Notice of the 
State Council on the Wide Application of Replicable Reform Experience from the Pilot Programs in China (Shanghai) 
Pilot Free Trade Zone)’ (21 December 2014). 10 State Council, ‘国务院关于做好自由贸易试验区新一批改革试点经验复制推广工作的通知 [No 63] (Notice of 
the State Council on the Further Application of Replicable Reform Experience from the Pilot Programs in China 
(Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone)’ (2 November 2016). 
11 State Council (n 5). 
12 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, ‘中国（上海）自由贸易试验区外商投资准入特别管理措施（负面清
单）（2013年） [No 75] (Special Administrative Measures on Foreign Investment Access to the China (Shanghai) 
Pilot Free Trade Zone (2013)’ (29 September 2013). 
13 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, ‘全国人大常委会关于授
权国务院在中国(广东)自由贸易试验区、中国(天津)自由贸易试验区、中国(福建)自由贸易试验区以及中国(上
海)自由贸易试验区扩展区域暂时调整有关法律规定的行政审批的决定 (Decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on Authorizing the State Council to Temporarily Adjust the Relevant Administrative 
Approval Items Prescribed by Law in the China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone, the China (Tianjin) Pilot Free 
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policies are introduced to the PFTZ. The uncertainty over the legal status and duration of these 
instruments as well as the associated ambiguity with which they manage the settlement of 
investment disputes – whether private-private or investor-state – and the review of investor related 
decisions by the PFTZ Management Committee could all give rise to disputes between PFTZ 
investors and the PRC.  
 
The PFTZ has not adopted sufficient preventive measures and resolution mechanisms to ensure the 
effective settlement of potential disputes arising from the uncertainty and ambiguity of its 
experimental policies. In order to explore the further steps that the PFTZ needs to take if it is to 
sustain its long-term development, this article discusses the possible causes of investor-state 
disputes with reference to a number of legal instruments key to the implementation of preferential 
policies inside the PFTZ. An interpretative analysis of the PFTZ’s Framework Plan and related 
legal instruments reveals legal uncertainty to be a potentially significant cause of disputes between 
PFTZ investors and the PRC. The article proposes solutions to the problems of legal uncertainty. 
Through a study of the PRC’s legal system, the PFTZ’s functioning, and foreign practice, the article 
presents an assessment of both the threats that the PFTZ is facing with the Framework Plan (see 
Section 3.1), the Negative List (see Section 3.2), the Decision (see Section 3.3), and the 
Management Method (see Section 3.4); as well as the opportunities available to it to withstand 
those threats (see Section 4).  
 
2. Political Economy and Law of the PFTZ 
 
The PFTZ, launched on 29 September 2013, is the PRC’s first free trade zone. The PFTZ, covering 
an area of about 120 square kilometres, comprises several customs supervision zones: the 
Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, Waigaoqiao Free Trade Logistics Park, Yangshan Free Trade Port 
Area, Pudong Airport Free Trade Zone, and, as of 1 March 2015, the Lujiazui Financial Area, 
Jinqiao Export Processing Zone, and Zhangjiang High Tech Park.15 
 
 
The PFTZ was established to further the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China and the State Council to facilitate the ‘reform and opening-up’16 of the country. To realise 
those aims, the PFTZ pursues four key policies: first, to open the service sector; secondly, to 
facilitate the transformation of government functions; thirdly, to reform the financial sector; and, 
fourthly, to enhance the convertibility of the RMB. These policies apply to all companies set up 
inside the PFTZ, without charging any fees or imposing any restrictions on their operations. In other 
words, there is no hidden price that the PFTZ companies have to pay for benefitting from the 
significant benefits that come with the PFTZ as an experimental setup. 
 
2.1. Opening Up the Service Sector 
 
Aware that a country’s economic development is linked to the degree of exposure to competition of 
its service sector, the PRC’s most recent step towards economic reform has taken off with a 
substantial expansion to the scope of service industries open to foreign investors. The PRC had 
previously been fairly reluctant to open up its service sector to foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
categorising service industries into ‘encouraged’, ‘restricted’, ‘prohibited’, and ‘permitted’ labels                                                                                                                                                                                         
Trade Zone, the China (Fujian) Pilot Free Trade Zone, and the Expanded Zone of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone)’ (28 December 2014). 
14 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 6). 
15 China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone, ‘Introduction’ (2016) <http://en.china-shftz.gov.cn/About-FTZ/Introduction/> 
accessed 30 January 2017; State Council,  ‘China’s External Debt Stands at $1.68 trillion in June’ (2 October 2015) 
<http://english.gov.cn/archive/statistics/2015/10/02/content_281475202939874.htm> accessed 30 January 2017. 
16 State Council (n 5) pt 1. 
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under the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment17 (the Catalogue), which is applied 
nationally to all foreign investors who wish to conduct business activities inside the PRC. The 
Services Trade Restrictive Index, published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in May 2014, compared the degree of restrictions on international trade and 
investment across 18 service industries in the PRC with 40 other countries, including the OECD 
member states, Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. The study revealed that the PRC 
displays a relatively high level of restrictiveness, particularly in service industries labelled 
‘restricted’ and ‘prohibited’, which are traditionally dominated by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
such as commercial banking, insurance and air transport services.18 
 
Hence, expanding the scope of service industries for FDI has been one of the major strategies of the 
PFTZ, particularly in financial services, shipping services, commercial trade services, professional 
services, cultural services, and social services. 19  Trade liberalisation largely depends on the 
effective removal of restrictions on trade in services, which, in turn, depends on the adoption of 
either a positive or a negative list approach in the Catalogue. A positive list permits only those 
service industries that are expressly stated on the list whereas a negative list permits all those 
industries that are not stated on the list. Hence, the negative list approach is often considered to be a 
more liberal approach. It also creates a ‘pro-liberalization dynamic’20 as the authorities are likely to 
shy away from the production of a lengthy negative list. 
 
The PFTZ’s unprecedented use of a negative list appears to offer greater market access than the 
PRC’s traditional positive list approach. Prior to the establishment of the PFTZ, foreign investors 
wishing to establish business in the PRC were required to consult the Catalogue to determine if 
their investment projects were within the permissible categories of FDI in the PRC. On 30 
September 2013, the first version 21 of the PFTZ Negative List was released by the Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government to specify the types of FDI that are not permitted in the PFTZ. An 
amended version of the Negative List was released in 2014,22 reducing the number of restrictions 
on the types of FDIs from 190 to 139. The 2015 Negative List further reduced the number of 
restrictions to 122,23 with a significant removal of restrictions on conducting business activities 
concerning the mining industry, 24  manufacturing industry 25  as well the wholesale and retail 
                                                        
17 State Development and Reform Commission & Ministry of Commerce, ‘外商投资产业指导目录(2015年) [No 22] 
(Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (2015 Revision)’ (10 March 2015). 
18 OECD, ‘STRI Sector Brief: Insurance’ (2014) <www.oecd.org/tad/services-trade/STRI_insurance.pdf> accessed 30 
January 2017; OECD, ‘STRI Sector Brief: Commercial Banking’ (2014) <www.oecd.org/tad/services-
trade/STRI_commercial_banking.pdf> accessed 30 January 2017; OCED, ‘STRI Sector Brief: Air Transport Services’ 
(2014) <www.oecd.org/tad/services-trade/STRI_air_transport_services.pdf> accessed 30 January 2017. 
19 State Council (n 5) pt 2. 
20 Patrick Low and Aaditya Mattoo, ‘Is There a Better Way? Alternative Approaches to Liberalization Under the 
GATS’ in Pierre Sauvé and Robert M Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization 
(Brookings Institution Press 2000) 468. 
21 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, ‘中国(上海)自由贸易试验区外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单) 
(2013年) [No 75] (Special Administrative Measures on Foreign Investment Access to the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free 
Trade Zone (Negative List) (2013)’ (29 September 2013). 
22 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, ‘中国(上海)自由贸易试验区外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单) 
(2014年修訂) [No 1] (Special Administrative Measures on Foreign Investment Access to the China (Shanghai) Pilot 
Free Trade Zone (Negative List) (2014)’ (30 June 2014). 
23 State Council, ‘国务院办公厅关于印发自由贸易试验区外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)的通知 [No 23] 
(Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the Special Management Measures (Negative List) for 
Foreign Investment Access in Pilot Free Trade Zones)’ (8 April 2015). 
24 ibid, pts 7-14. Given the limited space and resources available inside the PFTZ, the Negative List primarily applies to 
the research and development divisions of these companies deemed suitable to develop inside the PFTZ. 
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industry26 inside the PFTZ. Restrictions on processing food including rice,27 edible oils,28 and 
corn29 have been removed. Similar restrictions over alcohol,30 tea,31 and tobacco32 have also been 
removed. However, restrictions on motor vehicles, aircrafts, and ships remain, each requiring a 
Chinese investor to take up at least a 50 per cent interest or even a controlling interest in the 
Foreign-Invested Enterprise (FIE).33 
 
2.2. Facilitating the Transformation of Government Functions 
 
The adoption of a Negative List has significant implications not only for the liberalisation of foreign 
investment but also for the transformation of government functions. At present, foreign investors 
who invest outside the PFTZ are required to go through a time-consuming pre-approval process. 
First, investors must determine the nature of their proposed investment, that is, whether it would be 
classified as an ‘encouraged’, ‘permitted’, ‘restricted’, or ‘prohibited’ 34 project pursuant to the 
Catalogue and the Guiding Direction of Foreign Investment Provisions.35 Secondly, they must 
prepare a project application report, 36  including a feasibility study, for submission to the 
Development and Reform Commission (DRC), either at the local or national level. Depending on 
factors such as the total amount of investment and whether there is any restriction on Chinese 
shareholding,37 the application to the DRC, either at the local or national level, may be submitted by 
either filing (for registration purposes) or verification (which requires the application to be verified 
and approved by the authorities).38 Verification is a more onerous process, as it requires additional 
legal documents such as a letter of intent, approval documents from the Environment Protection 
Department, and an energy conservation rating from the Energy Conservation Department.39 Even                                                                                                                                                                                         
25 ibid, pts 15-30. Given the limited space and resources available inside the PFTZ, the Negative List primarily applies 
to the research and development divisions of these companies deemed suitable to develop inside the PFTZ. 
26 ibid, pts 37-40. 
27 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 22) pt 21. 
28 ibid, pt 22. 
29 ibid, pt 24. 
30 ibid, pt 25. 
31 ibid, pt 26. 
32 ibid, pts 27 and 28. 
33 State Council (n 23) pts 7-9. 
34 Guiding Direction of Foreign Investment Provisions (Promulgated by Decree No 346 of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China on 11 February 2002, and effective as of 1 April 2002) art 4. 
35 ibid. 
36 State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 
7; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) 
art 7; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国外资企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation of the 
PRC Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises Law 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 10.  
37 State Development & Reform Commission, ‘外商投资项目核准和备案管理办法 2014 [No 12] (Administrative 
Measures for the Confirmation and Recordation of Foreign-Funded Projects 2014)’ (17 May 2014) art 4; State 
Development & Reform Commission, ‘国家发展改革委关于修改《境外投资项目核准和备案管理办法》和《外商
投资项目核准和备案管理办法》有关条款的决定(2014) [No 2] (Decision of the National Development and Reform 
Commission on Amending the Relevant Clauses of the Measures for the Administration of the Confirmation and 
Recordation of Overseas Investment Projects and the Measures for the Administration of the Confirmation and 
Recordation of Foreign-Funded Projects (2014))’ (27 December 2014) art 2(2); State Council, ‘国务院关于发布政府
核准的投资项目目录(2014年本)的通知 [No 53] (Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Catalogue of Investment 
Projects Subject to Government Confirmation (2014)) (31 October 2014) art 11. 
38 State Development & Reform Commission, ‘外商投资项目核准和备案管理办法 2014 [No 12] (Administrative 
Measures for the Confirmation and Recordation of Foreign-Funded Projects 2014)’ (17 May 2014) art 3. 
39 ibid art 10. 
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after obtaining approval from the local or national DRC, depending on the total amount of the 
investment,40 foreign investors must also obtain approval for the form of FIE business vehicle by 
submitting a joint venture contract or articles of association to the Commission of Commerce 
(COFCOM) or Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). 41  After obtaining approval for the 
establishment of the project and the form of business vehicle, foreign investors must then obtain 
approval from the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC)42 for the aim and the 
business scope of the project before a business license can be issued. Importantly, in considering 
whether approval shall be given, the various authorities involved enjoy a high level of discretion in 
interpreting the broad criteria set out in the statues, for example, whether the project is in line with 
national development plans and industrial policies.43 These restrictive and complicated procedures 
have made the setting up of businesses in the PRC a relatively time-consuming exercise for foreign 
investors. 
 
The adoption of a Negative List inside the PFTZ, by contrast, means that only projects listed are 
subject to restriction or prohibition and, thus, need a pre-approval procedure. Foreign investors 
seeking to establish projects that are not mentioned in the list are only required to go through a 
record-filing procedure with the PFTZ Administrative Commission. To further expedite the setting 
up of businesses, the PFTZ simplifies this application process by establishing a one-stop application 
platform. Unlike the existing system that requires investors to submit documents to three different 
authorities for approval – local or national DRC, COFCOM or MOFCOM and SAIC – the one-stop 
system adopted in the PFTZ only requires investors to submit all application documents to the 
Authority for Industry and Commerce (AIC)44 for circulation as part of the approval and filing 
process. The AIC then issues the relevant license and certificates (business license, enterprise code 
certificate, and tax registration certificate) to the investors.45 As a result, while it may take around 
29 days to set up a business elsewhere in the PRC, it only takes around four days for a business 
license to be issued to a PFTZ investor.46 The new system also simplifies companies’ continuing  
obligations after incorporation. Companies set up inside the PFTZ are the first to enjoy a simplified                                                         
40 State Development & Reform Commission, ‘国家发展改革委关于做好外商投资项目下放核准权限工作的通知
2010 [No 914] (Notice of NDRC on Decentralizing the Verification Power for Foreign Investment Projects 2010)’ (4 
May 2010) art 11. 
41 State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 
6; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) 
art 7; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国外资企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation of the 
PRC Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises Law 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 7. 
42 State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 
9; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) 
art 9; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国外资企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation of the 
PRC Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises Law 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 12. 
43 State Development & Reform Commission (n 38) arts 16 and 19; State Development & Reform Commission (n 40) 
art 7. 
44 Shanghai Administration for Industry and Commerce, ‘工商总局关于授于上海市工商行政管理局自由贸易试验区
分局外商投资企业登记管理权的通知 (Circular of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on 
Authorizing the Administrative Authority of Foreign-Invested Enterprises Registration to the Branch of Shanghai 
Administration for Industry and Commerce in the Free Trade Zone)’ (24 September 2013). 
45  Yao Lu, ‘Establishing a Company in the Shanghai FTZ’ (China Briefing, 12 March 2014) <www.china-
briefing.com/news/2014/03/12/establishing-a-company-in-the-shanghai-ftz.html> accessed 30 January 2017. 
46 Giovanni Palmioli & Adam Heal, ‘Structural Economic Reform in China: The Role of the Shanghai Free Trade 
Zone’ [2014] 3 Trade Insights 6. 
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reporting regime – to publish information about the business on the AIC’s publicly available online 
platform – and do away with the former system of having an annual inspection.47 
 
Furthermore, to realise the PFTZ’s aim to facilitate trade liberalisation, major changes have been 
made to simplify customs procedures and regulations. First, goods entering the PFTZ from outside 
the PRC by Class B companies48 – the status of most newly established companies49 – can be 
declared within ‘14 days’50 of entry by completing simple ‘filing formalities’51 instead of the 
previous ‘administrative approval system’,52 together with a submission of the application form and 
a copy of the registration certificate.53 The post-entry declaration system is further expedited by the 
provision of an electronic platform to complete filing requirement for air and sea imports54 as well. 
 
2.3. Reforming the Financial Sector  
 
Given the substantial liberalisation of trade inside the PFTZ across different sectors, there is a need 
for a comprehensive reform of the financial sector to handle the accompanying increase in cross-
border business on financing and trade settlement. Already prior to the establishment of the PFTZ, 
the PRC government introduced different measures attempting to remedy the weaknesses of its 
financial system, such as removing the floor on lending rates 55 as well as reforming banking 
governance.56 
 
Under the PFTZ, various innovative policies have been introduced, one of which allows foreign 
banks to establish either wholly owned subsidiaries or joint venture banks inside the PFTZ.57 
Previously, foreign banks were not allowed to do so unless they had set up a representative office                                                         
47 Shanghai Administration for Industry and Commerce, ‘上海市工商行政管理局关于印发《关于中国（上海）自由
贸易试验区内企业登记管理的规定》的通知 (Shanghai Administration for Industry and Commerce’s Notice on 
Publishing the Regulation on the Management of Registration of Enterprises Inside the China (Shanghai) Free Trade 
Zone) (30 September 2013) art 14. 
48 Shanghai Customs, ‘上海海关关于在中国（上海）自由贸易试验区实施境外入区货物“先进区、后报关”作业模
式的公告 [No 6] (Announcement of Shanghai Customs on Implementing the Operation Mode of Goods entering the 
Zone from Abroad by ‘First Entering and then Declaring’ in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone)’ (21 April 2014) 
art 2(1). 
49 General Administration of Customs of PRC, ‘中华人民共和国海关企业分类管理办法 [No 197] (Measures of the 
Customs of the People’s Republic of China on the Classified Management of Enterprises)’ (30 November 2011). 
50 ibid art 5. 
51 ibid art 3. 
52 Shanghai Customs, ‘上海海关关于在中国（上海）自由贸易试验区内实施企业注册登记改革等事项的公告 [No 
28] (Announcement of Shanghai Customs on business registration reform in PFTZ)’ (30 June 2014) art 1. 
53 ibid. 
54 Shanghai Customs, ‘上海海关关于全面实施“放行信息电子化”管理的公告 [No 40] (Announcement of Shanghai 
Customs on Implementing the Electronic Platform for Shipping and Air Cargo)’ (8 October 2014); General 
Administration of Customs of PRC of Commerce of PRC, ‘海关总署 商务部关于从中国（上海） 自由贸易试验区
进口的涉及自动进口许可证管理货物开展通关作业无纸化试点的公告 [No 58] (Announcement of the General 
Administration of Customs and the Ministry of Commerce of PRC on Operating the PFTZ Electronic Platform)’ (5 
August 2014) art 1.  
55 Wei Liao and Sampawende J-A Tapsoba, ‘China’s Monetary Policy and Interest Rate Liberalization: Lessons from 
International Experiences’ Working Paper Series No 14/75 (International Monetary Fund, 2014) 6 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1475.pdf> accessed 30 January 2017. 
56 Didier Cossin & Abraham Lu, ‘The ICBC Path to Chinese Governance: Lessons for the Western and Emerging 
Markets’ The European Financial Review (December 2012/January 2013) 66 <https://tinyurl.com/jeyyxpr> accessed 30 
January 2017. 
57 Shen Wei, ‘“A Tale of Three Zones” – Promises and Pitfalls of Three Financial Experimental Zones in China’ [2014] 
Banking Law Journal 417. 
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for a minimum of two years. 58 Significant changes have also been made to liberalise offshore 
financing activities. Under the rules introduced by the Shanghai Head Office of the People’s Bank 
of China (PBOC),59 qualified participants, including corporate and non-bank financial institutions 
inside the PFTZ, 60 are now allowed to obtain offshore financing either in RMB or a foreign 
currency.61 More importantly, the limit on the amount of offshore funds that qualified participants 
can borrow has now been loosened. First, for FIEs outside the PTFZ, they are allowed to borrow the 
difference between their total investment amount and their registered capital.62 If FIEs need to 
borrow more than the permissible sum, they need to justify that the additional sum is for purposes 
envisaged in the bank’s business scope.63 Additionally, they need to apply for approval to increase 
the total amount of investment, which involves making the corresponding amendments to the joint 
venture contract or the articles of association.64 Therefore, FIEs need to submit their application to 
these authorities again before they can borrow the additional sum of money.  Domestic enterprises 
outside the PFTZ are also subject to a limit on the permissible amount of foreign debt, which is to 
be determined by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) or approved by the State 
Council within 15 business days after signing the loan agreements.65 In contrast, the permissible 
amount of foreign debt for participants inside the PFTZ is determined by capital, offshore financing 
leverage ratio and macro adjustment factors.66 Companies inside the PFTZ are allowed to borrow 
                                                        
58 State Council, ‘中华人民共和国外资银行管理条例 [No 478] (Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the 
Administration of Foreign-funded Banks) (11 November 2006 art 10(2). The restriction was subsequently lifted by an 
amendment made in 2014. Starting 1 January 2015, no foreign banks, whether inside or outside the PFTZ, will be 
subject to the restriction.  
59 Shanghai Head Office of People’s Bank of China, ‘中国（上海）自由贸易试验区分账核算业务境外融资 与跨境
资金流动宏观审慎管理实施细则（试行）[No 8] (The Trial Implementation Rules on the Macroscopic Prudent 
Management of Account-Based Settlement Business for Offshore Financing and Cross-Border Capital Flow in the 
China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone)’ (12 February 2015). 
60 ibid art 4. 
61 ibid art 5. 
62 State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 
17; State Council, ‘(中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则  2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the 
Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 2014)’ 
(19 February 2014) art 15; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国外资企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the 
Implementation of the PRC Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises Law 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 19. 
63 State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 
11; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则  2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the 
Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 2014)’ 
(19 February 2014) art 12; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国外资企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the 
Implementation of the PRC Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises Law 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 14. 
64 State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) arts 
11 and 13; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the 
Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 2014)’ 
(19 February 2014) arts 12 and 13; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国外资企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation 
on the Implementation of the PRC Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises Law 2014)’ (19 February 2014) arts 14 and 15. 
65 State Administration of Foreign Exchange, ‘国家外汇管理局关于发布《跨境担保外汇管理规定》的通知 [No 29] 
(Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issuing the Provisions on the Foreign Exchange 
Administration of Cross-border Guarantees)’ (12 May 2014) app 1, art 9.  
66 Shanghai Head Office of People’s Bank of China (n 59) art 7. 
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twice their capital whereas non-bank financial institutions are able to borrow two to three times 
their capital.67 
 
This relaxation has a significant implication for investors operating in the PRC since offshore 
borrowing has become a major source of finance over the years. In June 2015, the PRC had an 
outstanding foreign debt of around RMB 1.68 trillion.68 By February 2015, Chinese companies 
operating inside the PFTZ had already borrowed RMB 19.7 billion.69 Given the tighter control 
outside the PFTZ, companies sometimes need to set up offshore shell companies to avoid the 
borrowing limit and the requirement for prior approvals. However, transferring the money for 
onshore use has often been a cumbersome process for many investors. Corporates and non-bank 
financial institutions inside the PFTZ may now use foreign funds borrowed for production or 
operational activities and construction projects both inside the PFTZ and outside the PRC.70  
 
The PRC’s aim to liberalise trade across the whole country is evident from a circular71 published by 
the PBOC on extending the new rules implemented inside the PFTZ on offshore financing to the 
three other free trade zones72 in the PRC. As of 25 January 2016, twenty-four pilot domestic banks 
and three pilot foreign invested banks are allowed to conduct offshore financing in either RMB or a 
foreign currency as long as they comply with new macro prudential policies. The overarching 
principle of these polices is that the total amount of outstanding debt in RMB and foreign currencies 
after multiplying the applicable risk (Cross Border Financing Risk Weighted Outstanding) is not 
more than the Cross Border Financing Risk Weighted Outstanding Upper Limit (Upper Limit).73 In 
order to further facilitate the financing process, this new regime dispenses companies with the need 
to apply for pre-approval. Pilot companies are only required to file with SAFE after signing the 
cross-border financing agreement but within three business days before the drawdown. 74 Also, 
foreign currencies obtained through cross-border financing can be converted to RMB on actual need 
provided that they are used for operating the business without violating applicable PRC regulations 
and policies. 75  Whereas pilot financial institutions are required to submit the details of the 
calculation of the Cross Border Financing Risk Weighted Outstanding and the Upper Limit to the 
PBOC and SAFE before execution of the relevant cross-border financing agreement.76 Yet, pilot 
financial institutions are also allowed to convert foreign currencies borrowed through cross-border 
financing into RMB upon obtaining SAFE’s approval.77 More importantly, FIEs can choose to 
apply either this new rule or any existing applicable rules,78 both of which would simplify offshore 
borrowing procedures for them and enhance flexibility in financing their business activities, 
including RMB convertibility.  
 
2.4. Enhancing RMB Convertibility 
                                                         
67 ibid. 
68 State Council (n 15). 
69 Gabriel Wildau, ‘Shanghai Free Trade Zone Loosens Curbs on Offshore Borrowing’ (Financial Times, 13 February 
2015) <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3bd2056a-b339-11e4-b0d2-00144feab7de.html#axzz47wHy9RWL> accessed 
30 January 17. 
70 Shanghai Head Office of People’s Bank of China (n 59) art 14. 
71 People’s Bank of China, ‘中国人民银行关于扩大全口径跨境融资宏观审慎管理试点的通知 [No 18] (Circular 
of the People’s Bank of China on Expanding the Pilot Program of Prudent Macro Management of Cross-border 
Financing)’ (22 January 2016). 
72 Shanghai Free Trade Zone, Guangdong Free Trade Zone, Tianjin Free Trade Zone and Fujian Free Trade Zone. 
73 People’s Bank of China (n 71) art 3. 
74 ibid art 10. 
75 ibid art 10(4). 
76 ibid art 11(3). 
77 ibid art 11(4). 
78 ibid art 13(4). 
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Enhancing RMB convertibility has been one of the PFTZ’s key strategies to facilitate cross-border 
capital flow and establish Shanghai as an international financial center. The lack of a flexible 
exchange rate and an open capital account have presented some of the main hurdles for 
transforming the RMB into an international currency. Previously, FIEs could only make foreign 
exchange settlements by providing the authorities with details of the use of the funds and the extent 
of investment in specific FDI projects.79 SAFE would then clarify whether the needs were actual on 
a case-by-case basis before an approval could be granted.80 At present, FIEs operating inside the 
PFTZ are allowed to open a RMB deposit account ‘directly linked with their foreign exchange 
account’. 81  FIEs have full discretion in deciding when to make conversions between foreign 
currencies and RMB without having to specify the use of the funds, except in a few specific 
circumstances, for example, investing in illegal projects. 82  Furthermore, the new rules allow 
overseas financial leasing without first applying for approval. 
 
By enhancing the convertibility of the RMB, the PFTZ is able to handle foreign exchange 
settlements more effectively and, thus, facilitate the internationalisation of the RMB. The removal 
of restrictions over interest rates for deposits inside the PFTZ also strengthens the currency’s ability 
to cope with fluctuations in the global market. Starting 1 March 2014, the Shanghai PBOC removed 
the prescribed maximum interest rate for banks set up inside the PFTZ if the deposit in foreign 
currencies is less than USD 500,000.83 This deregulation enables banks to enjoy greater degree of 
flexibility in fixing appropriate interest rates according to the demand and supply of foreign 
currencies in the domestic market as well as competition from neighbouring countries. Ultimately, 
it allows the PFTZ to lure business opportunities and channel currencies from abroad more 
effectively. 
 
3. The Problem of Legal Uncertainty as a Cause of Investment Disputes 
 
Strategies aside, numerous are the laws and measures that establish the PFTZ. Among those laws 
and measures, four provide for preferential treatment to foreign investors in the PFTZ (PFTZ 
investors). First is the Framework Plan,84 which details the strategic policies and reforms to be 
implemented inside the PFTZ. Second is the Negative List,85 which details the list of industry 
sectors that are subject to restriction. Third is the Decision, 86 which removes the requirement 
imposed on foreign investors to apply for administrative approvals before making an investment in 
the PRC as stated in four sets of legal documents.87 And fourth is the Management Method,88 which                                                         
79 Wei (n 57) 419. 
80  Regulation of People’s Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration (2008) art 12 
<https://tinyurl.com/hn7pa38> accessed 30 January 2017.  
81 Shanghai Exchange, ‘国家外汇管理局关于在部分地区开展外商投资企业外汇资本金结汇管理方式改革试点有
关问题的通知 [No 36] (Notice of Shanghai Branch of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issuing the 
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Regulations on Foreign Exchange Management in the China (Shanghai) Pilot 
Free Trade Zone)’ (4 August 2014) annex, art 2. 
82 ibid art 12. 
83 Shanghai Head Office of People’s Bank of China, ‘中国人民银行上海总部关于在中国（上海）自由贸易试验区
放开小额外币存款利率上限的通知 [No 23] (Circular of the Shanghai Head Office of People’s Bank of China on 
removing the ceiling of interest rate for small-denomination deposits in foreign currencies in the China (Shanghai) Pilot 
Fee Trade Zone)’ (25 February 2014). 
84 State Council (n 5). 
85 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 21). 
86 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (n 13). 
87 State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014); 
State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation of 
the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014); 
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gives an overview of the relevant legislation and authorities involved in the management of the 
PFTZ. These legal instruments are exceptional because they promote and protect foreign investment 
in the PFTZ even though the approach to the regulation of foreign investment market access 
everywhere else in the PRC is protectionist. Yet, because they are exceptional, they cannot rely on 
precedent to give them legal certainty. This section of the article explains the uncertainty that 
characterises the Framework Plan, the Negative List, the Decision, and the Management Method 
and argues that such uncertainty can cause disputes between PFTZ investors and the PRC. 
 
3.1. The Framework Plan 
 
he Framework Plan establishes a tribunal and an arbitration centre for the PFTZ. It defines the 
scope of their jurisdiction in terms of a connection with the PFTZ. These terms are uncertain. The 
PFTZ tribunal of the Shanghai Pudong New Area People’s Court, including the PFTZ intellectual 
property tribunal, function as the court of the PFTZ (PFTZ Court), which has jurisdiction to settle 
private-private disputes ‘connected with’ 89  the PFTZ. In parallel, the Shanghai International 
Economy and Trade Arbitration Commission (also known as the Shanghai International Arbitration 
Center (SHIAC)) functions as the arbitration centre of the PFTZ (PFTZ Court of Arbitration),90 
which has jurisdiction to arbitrate91 private-private disputes ‘connected with’92 the PFTZ. Wholly 
foreign owned enterprises registered within the PFTZ would be allowed to arbitrate their case in a 
foreign arbitration institution if they have entered into an arbitration agreement that allows for the 
submission of their disputes to arbitration outside the PRC.93 However, for parties intending to take 
their disputes to the PFTZ Court or the PFTZ Court of Arbitration, the Framework Plan does not 
state the criteria that determine the degree of connection with the PFTZ necessary for the PFTZ 
Court and PFTZ Court of Arbitration to have jurisdiction in a case. Such uncertainty can, 
theoretically speaking, cause both private-private disputes among PFTZ investors and private-
public disputes between PFTZ investors and the PRC, for example, whether certain cases should be 
handled by the PFTZ Court or courts outside the PFTZ. Subsequent amendment has failed to clarify 
this ambiguity. On 27 April 2015, the Shanghai Pudong New Area People’s Court announced an 
extension to the PFTZ Court’s scope of jurisdiction commensurate with the expansion of the PFTZ. 
First, the PFTZ Court is now responsible for handling commercial and intellectual property matters 
of a civil, criminal or administrative nature that are ‘connected with’ the four original customs 
supervision zones formerly comprising the PFTZ.94 Secondly, the PFTZ Court is now responsible 
for handling commercial and intellectual property matters that are ‘connected with’ either the three 
newly expanded areas of the PFTZ95 or foreign parties, Hong Kong, Taiwan and FIEs in other 
zones of the Pudong New Area. 96 Thirdly, based on the PFTZ’s own development, the Pudong                                                                                                                                                                                         
State Council, ‘中华人民共和国外资企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation of the PRC 
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises Law 2014)’ (19 February 2014); Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, ‘中华人民共和国台湾同胞投资保护法 1994 [No 20] (Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Protection of Investments of Taiwan Compatriots 1994)’ (5 March 1994). 
88 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 6). 
89  Shanghai FTZ Court, ‘Jurisdiction of the PFTZ Court’ (2015) 
<www.ftzcourt.gov.cn:8080/zmqweb/gweb/content.jsp?pa=aaWQ9NjEzMzkmeGg9MQPdcssPdcssz> accessed 30 
January 2017. 
90 Shanghai International Arbitration Rules (2014) art 2. 
91 ibid art 3. Either upon the ‘party’s agreement’. 
92 ibid. 93 Supreme People’s Court, ‘最高人民法院关于为自由贸易试验区建设提供司法保障的意见 [No 34] (Opinions on 
Providing Judicial Protection for the Construction of Pilot Free Trade Zones)’ (30 December 2016) art 9(1). 
94 Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone, Waigaoqiao Free Trade Logistics Park, Yangshan Free Trade Port Area and Pudong 
Airport Free Trade Zone. 
95 Lujiazui Financial Area, Jinqiao Export Processing Zone, and Zhangjiang High Tech Park. 
96 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, ‘浦东新区人民法院对自贸区法庭受案范围做相应调整 (The Pudong 
New Area People’s Court Made Adjustments to the PFTZ Court’s Scope of Jurisdiction) (2015) 
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New Area’s economic development and the reform of the government systems, the PFTZ Court 
shall adjust its scope of jurisdiction accordingly.97 Thus, the new rule perpetuates the uncertainty of 
the former rule by continuing with the use of the generic phrase ‘connected with’ and giving 
extensive discretion to the court in deciding whether a case falls into any of the aforesaid areas 
(Applicable Areas) and should be accepted. Since the PFTZ is a scheme for the PRC to test the 
viability of a more favourable legal environment for the liberalisation of trade and investment, 
restrictions on foreign investment applicable elsewhere in the PRC are not applicable in the PFTZ.98 
This development could potentially lead to a more favourable outcome for PFTZ investors than the 
likely outcome if their disputes were to come for settlement before a court other than the PFTZ 
Court or the PFTZ Court of Arbitration. Also, the validity of an award granted by any courts other 
than the PFTZ Court or the PFTZ Court of Arbitration in the PFTZ may not be guaranteed. Hence, 
the existing uncertainty may cause disputes among PFTZ investors and or between them and the 
PRC authorities if PFTZ investors believe their matters are not being handled by the appropriate 
court as a result of any such uncertainty. Thus, a clear definition of the scope of jurisdiction (that is, 
the proper venue for handling disputes) could reduce administrative and time costs for both the 
authorities and investors.  
 
3.2. The Negative List 
 
The Negative List extends ‘pre-access national treatment’ 99  to PFTZ investors. Despite its 
significance to the promotion and protection of foreign investment in the PFTZ (negative list pilot 
reform projects have launched elsewhere in the PRC, including Guangdong, Tianjin, and Fujian), 
the Negative List has an unclear legal status within the current PRC legal structure, which could 
potentially cause investor-state disputes, as have been observed by certain Chinese legal scholars100 
and will be discussed below. The latest revised Negative List was announced by the State Council 
in 2015.101 However, the list does not provide details of the authority who enacted the list. It only 
states – equivocally so – that the list has been made in accordance with ‘the relevant laws and 
regulations currently in force’.102 Earlier versions of the Negative List issued in 2013 and 2014 
respectively did not offer any clear explanations either. Both versions were announced by the 
Shanghai Municipal Government,103 without specific reference to the relevant enacting authority. 
 
Under the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Legislation 2015, valid forms of laws are, 
first, laws ‘enacted and amended’ 104  by the National People’s Congress (NPC), namely the 
Constitution of the PRC105 and such other Basic Laws,106 and, secondly, laws107 ‘enacted and 
amended’108 by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC).109 Thus, the 
only government bodies that can exercise ‘legislative power of the state’ 110 are the NPC and                                                                                                                                                                                         
<www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw2/nw2314/nw32419/nw32510/nw32511/nw32516/u21aw1004339.html> accessed 30 
January 2017. 
97 ibid. 
98 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (n 13). 
99 ibid art 11. 
100 See, for example, Shen Hai Ping, ‘The Legal Status and Adjustment of the Negative List of the China (Shanghai) 
Pilot Free Trade Zone (上海自贸区的法律地位及其调整)’ [2014] 5 Oriental Law 131. 
101 State Council (n 23). 
102 ibid art 1. 
103 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 22); Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 21). 
104 PRC Legislation Law (2015) art 7. 
105 ibid art 87. With the ‘highest legal authority’. 
106 ibid art 7.  
107 ibid.  
108 ibid. 
109 ibid. With the exception of laws that can only be enacted by the NPC. 
110 PRC Constitution (2004) art 58; PRC Legislation Law (2015) art 7. 
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SCNPC. However, the NPC and SCNPC can ‘authorise’ 111  the State Council to make 
‘administrative regulations’.112 Local People’s Congresses and the Standing Committees of Local 
People’s Congresses of a ‘province, autonomous region, or municipality’113 directly under the PRC 
government can make ‘local regulations’ if necessary,114 whereas the People’s Government of such 
subnational jurisdictions can make administrative rules for the purposes set out in Article 82 of the 
Legislation Law. 
 
Therefore, given that the PFTZ is under the administration of the PFTZ Management Committee115 
instead of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, the 2013 and 2014 versions of the 
Negative List announced by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government could not have been 
enacted as laws. Presumably, the Negative List would have the status either as an administrative 
regulation or as a local regulation applicable only to the PFTZ. However, even if that presumption 
were to hold true, such a regulation would not be valid unless either the ‘Standing Committee of the 
Local People’s Congress’116 or ‘provincial governor, chairman of the autonomous region or mayor 
of the city’117 had enacted it by way of an ‘announcement’.118 Under the Management Method, 
which is a local administrative rule released by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, the 
Shanghai Municipal People’s Government was to ‘announce’ the Negative List.119 Since the PFTZ 
does not come under the administration of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, its 
authority to announce the Negative List for the PFTZ is questionable. 
 
On one argument, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government had authority to announce the 
Negative List for the PFTZ. After all, under the Framework Plan, the Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government shall make ‘administrative rules for the PFTZ’120 through ‘local legislation.121 This 
provision could suggest122 that the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government is acting under the 
authorisation of the State Council to make laws for the PFTZ, which would, accordingly, give the 
Negative List legal status as a piece of authorised legislation. In the legal system of the PRC, 
‘authorised legislation’123 refers to a ‘legal document’ 124 issued by a body with no legislative power 
under the authorisation of another body with the requisite legislative power. The Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government makes authorised legislation from time to time. In 2012, for 
example, the Standing Committee of Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress issued a Decision on 
Promoting Innovation and Transitional Development in response to a Central Government plan to 
create a more favourable environment for scientific research in Shanghai. This legal instrument 
enables the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government to make regulations with respect to five 
matters, namely the ‘liberalisation, betterment of the market system, recruitment of talent, creation                                                         
111 PRC Legislation Law, ibid art 9. 
112 ibid art 8. In areas under art 8 for objectives under art 65 of the Legislation Law (2015) except where the NPC or 
SCNPC have similar regulations. 
113 ibid art 72. 
114 ibid, unless they conflict with the PRC Constitution, laws or administrative regulations.  
115 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 6) art 4. 
116 PRC Legislation Law (2015) art 78. 
117 ibid art 85. 
118 ibid arts 78 and 85. 
119 It is also responsible for ‘formulating’ the accompanying Management Method for the Approval and Filing of 
Foreign Investment Items: Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 6) art 11. 
120 State Council (n 5) pt 11 (9). 
121 ibid. 
122 Liu Hua, ‘A Study on the Legal Issues Concerning the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone – Innovative 
Management, Giving the Green Light and Advance Legislation’ (中国（上海）自由贸易试验区法律问题研究—— 
管理创新、“法律绿灯”与地方先行立法) [2014] 2 Oriental Law 126. 
123 Hu Huai and Li Chang Xi, ‘Some Issues on Authorized Legislation（授权立法若干问题研究)’ (2001) 16(5) 
Journal of Henan University of Economics and Law 58. 
124 ibid. 
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of an entrepreneurial environment and rectification of the existing social exclusion system’.125 On 
this argument, if the Negative List contained similar authorisations for a set of specified goals, it 
should already have legal status as a piece of authorised legislation. 
 
On another argument, the Negative List does not contain all the necessary details to meet the 
requirements for a piece of authorised legislation, even in its latest 2015 version. First, the State 
Council does not have autonomous power to make laws. It can receive authorisation to make 
administrative regulations on a list of matters126 for the purposes127 set out in the Legislation Law. 
However, the design of the Negative List relies not only on adjustments to certain administrative 
regulations but also on adjustments to four national laws.128 Such adjustments are outside the scope 
of the legislative power of the State Council and, hence, they are also outside the scope of any 
prospective authorisation that it could give. Secondly, the Legislation Law requires, as the Decision 
on Promoting Innovation and Transitional Development shows, any piece of authorised legislation 
to state clearly its of ‘objective and scope’.129 Such detail is absent from the text of the Negative 
List. This lack of detail is likely to raise even more difficult issues in the light of the most recent 
amendment to the Legislation Law. 130 Further to this amendment, an authorisation shall state 
essential details such as its ‘purpose, subject matter, scope and term of empowerment’; 131 no 
authorisation shall exceed ‘five years’; and, any request to extend the limitation period of an 
authorisation shall be made ‘six months prior to the expiration’.132 The amendment suggests that the 
intention of the Central Government is to limit the use of authorised legislation. Therefore, without 
an express statement that addresses the requisite details, it is unlikely that the Negative List can 
acquire legal status as a piece of authorised legislation by either the State Council in its 2015 
version or the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government in its 2014 and 2013 versions.  
 
Though the Negative List does not qualify as a piece of authorised legislation, it constitutes a form 
of Normative Document (ND). NDs are legally binding documents that administrative units issue 
from time to time in order to ‘complement the execution of relevant laws, regulations, rules and 
policies of the State’.133 They are not, however, considered to be a piece of law. Further to the 
Notice from the Central Office and State Council on publishing the Rules on Handling Official 
Documents of Party Units, NDs may exist in various forms, such as in the form of an ‘order, 
decision, announcement or notice’.134 The Negative List constitutes a ND because, first, it is in the 
form of an announcement; secondly, the State Council and the Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government respectively had the authority to announce the Negative List ‘in response to decisions 
                                                        
125 Shanghai People’s Congress, ‘上海市人大常委会发布关于促进创新驱动、转型发展的决定 [No 50] (Decision 
on Promoting Innovation and Transitional Development)’ (7 June 2012) art 7. 
126 PRC Legislation Law (2015) art 8. 
127 ibid art 65 
128 See references in n 87. 
129 PRC Legislation Law (2015) art 10. 
130 Shuang Yang, ‘Explanation Session on the Approval of the PRC Legislation Law Amendment (Draft) (立法法修正
案 ( 草 案 ) 获 通 过  赞 成 2761 票  反 对 81 票 ’ (China.com, 15 March 2014) 
<http://news.china.com.cn/2015lianghui/2015-03/15/content_35056802.htm> accessed 30 January 2017. 
131 PRC Legislation Law (2015) art 10. 
132 ibid. 
133 Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council (PRC), ‘An Analysis of the Basic Procedure on Formulating Other 
Normative Documents ( 浅 析 制 定 其 他 规 范 性 文 件 的 一 般 程 序 )’ (2011) 
<http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/dfxx/dffzxx/yn/201102/20110200333341.shtml> accessed 30 January 2017. 
134 Central Office & State Council, ‘中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅关于印发《党政机关公文处理工作条例》的
通知  [No 14] (Notice from the Central Office and State Council on publishing the Rules on Handling official 
documents of Party Units)’ (14 April 2012) art 8. 
 15 
made by the State’s Superior Administrative Unit’;135 and, thirdly, the Negative List does not have 
a ‘specific target of application’136 and can apply ‘repeatedly’137 to the same party. In other words, 
the Negative List applies however many times a PFTZ investor makes an investment. 
 
The problem is that, although NDs are legally binding, the People’s Courts,138 including the PFTZ 
Court, cannot accept disputes related to NDs. They can only adjudicate laws.139 And NDs are not 
laws. In principle, then, PFTZ investors are not able to bring disputes related to the Negative List 
before the PFTZ Court. In practice, however, the courts do occasionally accept disputes concerning 
NDs. In the absence of specific laws in support of such a practice, courts have so far taken a highly 
subjective approach to NDs. In 2007, for example, Wang He An and three other private parties 
brought an action against the Xinxiang Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision in response to 
a requisition140 for households to renew their gas meters and pay the subsequent renewal charge. 
The Xinxiang Municipal Intermediate People’s Court refused to accept the case since the document 
at issue did not target a specific party and could apply repeatedly. It ruled that the requisition was an 
ND and, accordingly, that it could not adjudicate the matter. Yet, in 2002, a similar case had a 
different outcome. The Jiangsu Pricing Bureau published an approval141 to validate a request by the 
Nanjing Municipal Public Utilities Bureau to adjust transport fares. By introducing the use of a 
smart payment card, the Nanjing Municipal Public Utilities Bureau proposed to charge the same 
fare for passengers regardless of their age. Chen Zhi Chung, one of the many card users, brought an 
action against the Jiangsu Pricing Bureau to challenge the legitimacy of the Jiangsu Pricing 
Bureau’s approval for the new fare system given that the Jiangsu Pricing Bureau was in a 
contractual relationship with the card company, which suggested a potential conflict of interests. 
Though the approval at issue was presented in a similar format to that of the requisition in Wang He 
An’s action, the court accepted the case. It interpreted the approval as a document that cannot be 
applied more than once on the same passenger and was, therefore, a piece of law rather than an ND. 
However, the approval can also be interpreted as an ND since it can be applied repeatedly. In fact, 
the approval applies every time a passenger pays any fare under the new fare system.142 Hence, it                                                         
135 National People’s Congress, ‘中华人民共和国地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法 2004 [No 30] 
(Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the People's Republic of China 
2004)’ (27 October 2004) art 59(1); Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, ‘全国人大常委会关于修
改《中华人民共和国地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法》、《中华人民共和国全国人民代表大
会和地方各级人民代表大会选举法》、《中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会代表法》
的决定 ) [No 33] (Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending the 
Organization Law of the People's Republic of China for Local People’s Congresses at All Levels and Local People’s 
Governments at All Levels, the Election Law of the People’s Republic of China for the National People’s Congress and 
Local People’s Congresses at All Levels, and the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Deputies to the National 
People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses at All Levels’ (29 August 2015). 
136 Supreme People’s Court, ‘最高人民法院关于执行《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》若干问题的解释 [No 8] 
(Supreme People’s Court’s Explanation on that State’s Method for Handling Documents of Administrative Units)’ (8 
March 2000) art 3. 
137 ibid. 
138 PRC Administrative Litigation Law (2014) art 13(2). 
139 ibid art 5. 
140 Xinxiang Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, ‘关于采取强制措施推进超期燃气表更换工作的报告的答
复函 [No 4] (Response to the Report on the Compulsory Measures for Promoting the Changing of Gas Meters)’ (19 
February 2005). 
141 Jiangsu Pricing Bureau, ‘关于公交票价改革的批复 [No 276] (Approval for the Adjustment on Fare)’ (27 August 
2002). 
142 Zhang Min, ‘Judicial Practice of the Normativity of Administrative Litigation Rules – Using Normative Documents 
as Example (从司法实践看行政诉讼法规则的规范性问题——以其他规范性文件为视角)’ (2011) 21 (3) Journal of 
Jinan University (Social Science Edition) 89. 
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probably was inappropriate for the court to adjudicate the matter. These cases demonstrate the 
inconsistent approach taken by PRC courts to the interpretation of NDs. Such inconsistent 
interpretations reveal the problem of relying solely on the Administrative Litigation Law to secure 
the right of PFTZ investors regarding any disputes concerning NDs, such as the Negative List, 
before the PFTZ Court. 
 
A recent amendment to the Administrative Litigation Law is unlikely to solve the problem that the 
ND status of the Negative List presents to PFTZ investors. The amendment only allows courts to 
accept disputes concerning NDs as long as the challenge is to its ‘legality’.143 Therefore, PFTZ 
investors may still face difficulty in putting their case to the PFTZ Court if they concern matters 
other than the legality of the Negative List, such as the interpretation of a specific clause or a 
decision made pursuant to the Negative List. These matters would likely remain outside the scope 
of judicial jurisdiction of the PFTZ Court.  
 
3.3. The Decision 
 
The Decision144 can also be the cause of disputes between PFTZ investors and the PRC because it 
too has an unclear legal status, as the article discusses below. In order to create an attractive 
environment for foreign investment in the PFTZ, while at the same time avoiding an extensive 
reform to the legal system of the PRC, the PRC government took action in two respects. First, by 
way of the Negative List, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government and, subsequently, the 
State Council dispensed PFTZ investors with the need to obtain government approval except for 
limited investments. Secondly, by way of the Decision, the State Council suspended the 
implementation inside the PFTZ of four national laws, namely, the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Foreign-funded Enterprises 2000, Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2001, Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign 
Contractual Joint Ventures 2000, and Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of 
Investments of Taiwan Compatriots 1994. These laws require joint venture agreements with foreign 
parties as well as foreign-funded enterprises to obtain government approval,145 a requirement that is 
contrary to the PFTZ’s goal to create an internationalised business-friendly environment. 
 
The State Council announced the Decision with the authorisation of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress (SCNPC).146 In the absence of relevant ‘national laws’ (that is, laws 
enacted and amended by the NPC and/or SCNPC),147 the State Council can be authorised to make 
administrative regulations with respect to certain matters that would have been under the legislative 
power of the NPC or SCNPC.148 The Decision concerns a ‘foreign trade system’,149 a matter that 
should be governed by laws to be enacted by the NPC and/or SCNPC or by administrative 
regulations to be made by the State Council pursuant to the Legislation Law, the law that regulates                                                         
143 PRC Administrative Litigation Law (2014) art 6.  
144 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (n 13). 
145 State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 
5; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation 
of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 2014)’ (19 February 2014) 
art 5; State Council, ‘中华人民共和国外资企业法实施细则 2014 [No 648] (Regulation on the Implementation of the 
PRC Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises Law 2014)’ (19 February 2014) art 6; Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, ‘中华人民共和国台湾同胞投资保护法 1994 [No 20] (Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Protection of Investments of Taiwan Compatriots 1994)’ (5 March 1994) art 8. 
146 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (n 13). 
147 PRC Legislation Law (2015) art 9. 
148 ibid art 8.  
149 ibid art 8(ix). 
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law-making procedures in the PRC. However, the SCNPC had already legislated with respect to 
this matter through the four national laws that the Decision suspends. The Decision, therefore, 
contravenes the Legislation Law150 and cannot qualify as a piece of authorised legislation. Such 
uncertainty in legal status has significant implications for PFTZ investors because, if the Decision 
does not qualify as a piece of authorised legislation, the only other legal instrument that secures 
preferential treatment for PFTZ investors is the Negative List, which is no more than an ND. More 
importantly, the Decision provides that, if the suspension that it introduces fails to attract foreign 
investment to the PFTZ over the course of its implementation period between 2014 and 2017, the 
four national laws in question shall resume their effect in the PFTZ. Hence, the Decision, without a 
proper legal status and a long-term plan for the application of preferential treatment, can cause 
disputes between PFTZ investors and the PRC, such as about the period during which the Negative 
List shall remain effective. Ultimately, it does not reconcile the need to promote and protect foreign 
investment in the PFTZ with the need to preserve the pre-existing regulatory regime across the 
whole of the PRC. 
 
3.4. The Management Method 
 
The Management Method151 provides that the settlement of disputes between PFTZ investors and 
the PRC should be done with reference to the Administrative Reconsideration Law and 
Administrative Litigation Law. This general provision gives rise to several issues. First, it does not 
specify the preconditions that PFTZ investors must meet before they can apply for an administrative 
review or initiate administrative litigation proceedings if they disagree with certain decisions made 
by the relevant authorities regarding their business operation inside the PFTZ. The Administrative 
Reconsideration Law only states that, if the ‘relevant provisions of laws or regulations’ 152 so 
require, parties shall obtain an administrative reconsideration from the relevant reviewing body 
prior to the initiation of administrative litigation proceedings. The language of this provision is 
inconclusive and makes no reference to the laws and measures that the parties must consult. 
Moreover, the Administrative Reconsideration Law153 does not assist PFTZ investors since the 
Negative List is a ND and, accordingly, it is outside the scope of application of the provision. In the 
absence of additional provisions to compensate for the fact that, under the Administrative Litigation 
Law,154 the courts cannot accept disputes concerning NDs, the Management Method leaves PFTZ 
investors with one option only: to apply for an administrative reconsideration if they want to 
challenge any decision involving the Negative List, for example, any management decisions or 
measures taken by the PFTZ Management Committee. Such a limitation is significant because an 
administrative reconsideration can only be successful if it satisfies what are perfectly ambiguous 
criteria, such as an ‘erroneous application of law’155 or a ‘obvious inappropriateness of the specific 
administrative act’. 156  Without a careful revision of the criteria to assess the degree of 
inappropriateness, the Administrative Reconsideration Law gives the reviewing body excessive 
discretion over statutory interpretation and may, therefore, not provide effective protection to PFTZ 
investors.  
 
Secondly, although the Management Method empowers the PFTZ Management Committee to make 
decisions on administrative penalties in relation to a range of matters, it only vaguely requires such 
decisions to be made by reference to ‘relevant laws, regulations and rules’ 157  of different 
government departments. Without a clear indication of the laws and measures to which the PFTZ                                                         
150 ibid art 9. 
151 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 6) art 36. 
152 PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law (2009) art 16. 
153 ibid 7. 
154 PRC Administrative Litigation Law (2014) art 13(2). 
155 PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law (2009) art 28(3)(b). 
156 ibid art 28(3)(e). 
157 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 6) app 3. 
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Management Committee must refer to before it can issue an administrative penalty, the 
Management Method confers on the PFTZ Management Committee excessive discretion in the 
exercise of its authority and leaves PFTZ investors in a state of legal uncertainty. 
 
The Management Method does not establish an effective settlement mechanism for handling 
disputes between PFTZ investors and the Management Committee. In order to enhance its 
effectiveness, at least five modifications are necessary. One, the mechanism should prescribe the 
circumstances in which a party could apply for an administrative reconsideration or initiate 
administrative litigation proceedings, particularly for parties who want to challenge decisions made 
under the Negative List, an ND. Two, the mechanism should make reference to the laws and 
measures that guide the Management Committee in the issuance of administrative penalties. Three, 
the mechanism should shorten the time limit applicable to the reviewing body in the interest of a 
more efficient dispute management system. Four, the mechanism should allow the commercial 
activities that are the subject of the dispute to continue while the applicant awaits the decision. 
Fifth, the mechanism should state the basis for which recourse against the decisions of the 
Management Committee could be made. With the introduction of these modifications, the dispute 
settlement mechanism would be likely to manage disputes more effectively as it would be taking 
the natural constraints of PFTZ investors into account and, in turn, ensure the proper functioning of 
the PFTZ.  
 
4. Solutions to the Problem of Legal Uncertainties as a Cause of Investment Disputes 
 
Even though the PFTZ, like any other free trade area, is sure to give rise to countless investor-state 
disputes, the PRC has given little regard to the legal uncertainties that affects the PFTZ. Through an 
interpretative analysis of a select series of legal instruments that regulate the functioning of the 
PFTZ, this article has shown that legal uncertainty can indeed cause disputes between PFTZ 
investors and the PRC. This section of the article proposes three solutions to the problem of legal 
uncertainty. The first proposal is to specify the test to assess the degree of connection with the 
PFTZ as the criterion to determine the scope of jurisdiction of the PFTZ Court and the PFTZ Court 
of Arbitration (Section 4.1.). The second proposal is to clarify the legal status of the two most 
significant legal instruments to the functioning of the PFTZ, namely, the Negative List and the 
Decision (Section 4.2.). The third proposal is to reform the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
PFTZ under the Management Method (Section 4.3.).  
 
4.1. Rational Connection as the Test for Judicial and Arbitral Jurisdiction 
 
Arguably,158 the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-related Civil 
Relationships (LFCR)159 can clarify the ambiguity of the phrase – ‘connected with’160 – in the rules 
for deciding the justiciability of the PFTZ Court (Justiciability Rules) 161  and the Shanghai 
International Arbitration Rule 2014,162 which determines the scope of the jurisdiction of the PFTZ 
Court and PFTZ Court of Arbitration. Resort to interpretation by analogy, however, cannot assist in 
the management of the particular types of dispute likely to arise between PFTZ investors and the                                                         
158 Shu Hai, ‘Opinions on Legal Protection for the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (关于自贸区司法保障的几点意见)’ 
(2013) <http://www.mjshsw.org.cn/shmj2011/node713/u1ai1769548.html> accessed 30 January 2017. 
159 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, ‘中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法 [No 36] (Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-related Civil Relationships)’ (28 October 2010). 
160 Institute of China Free Trade Zone Law (East China University of Political Science and Law), ‘Research on the 
Judicial Protection Mechanism of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone (上海自由贸易试验区的司法保障机制
问题研究)’ (2015) <http://ftz.ecupl.edu.cn/index.php?c=article&id=231> accessed 30 January 2017. 
161 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 96). 
162 Shanghai International Arbitration Rules (2014) art 8. 
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PRC. Under the LFCR, a matter involves foreign elements if, either one or more of the parties to the 
dispute reside ‘outside’ the PRC;163 or the property that is the subject of the dispute is ‘outside’164 
the PRC; or the relevant facts that constitute the cause of action have occurred ‘outside’165 the PRC. 
On that same rationale, then, the degree of connection necessary under either the Justiciability 
Rules or the Arbitration Rule 2014 would require either that one or more of the parties to the 
dispute reside inside the PFTZ; or that the property that is the subject of the dispute is inside the 
PFTZ; or, that the ‘establishment, change or termination’166 of the relevant facts that constitute the 
cause of action have occurred inside the PFTZ. 
 
Such an interpretation fails to take into account the unique aims that these three different sets of 
rules – the LFCR, Justiciability Rules and the Arbitration Rule 2014 – seek to realise. The aim of 
the LFCR is to confer on foreign parties better legal protection since, prior to its enactment, the 
relevant laws and measures applicable to foreign parties in civil actions were scattered167 over 
different pieces of legislation and, thus, could not comprise a systematic168 and holistic regime. 
Accordingly, the aim of the LFCR is to cover a wide range of matters with respect to various 
aspects of the life and work of foreign parties in the PRC. In comparison, while the aim of the 
Justiciability Rules and the Arbitration Rule 2014 is also to confer on foreign parties better legal 
protection, they have a much narrower coverage. Both legal instruments aim to complement the 
Framework Plan on the functioning of the PFTZ in that it creates a legal environment for foreign 
investment in the PFTZ that is consistent with international standards. 
 
Hence, the measure of the connection should not only be in terms of a geographical connection with 
the PFTZ but also in terms of a rational connection with the aim of its rules. Rational connection 
should then be the dominant criterion to determine whether the PFTZ Court or the PFTZ Court of 
Arbitration can accept a case. Thus, matters that do not connect rationally with the commercial 
activities conducted by PFTZ investors should not come before the PFTZ Court or the PFTZ Court 
of Arbitration. Also, an indiscriminate allocation of cases merely on the basis of their geographical 
connection with the PFTZ would overburden the PFTZ Court and, subsequently, limit its capacity 
to settle commercial disputes where time is, usually, of the essence. Consequently, in order to 
maximise the efficiency of the dispute settlement system of the PFTZ, disputes that do not concern 
commercial activities in the Applicable Areas should not come before the PFTZ Court or PFTZ 
Court of Arbitration. At the same time, matters that have no geographical connection with the 
Applicable Areas should, nonetheless, be open to the PFTZ Court and PFTZ Court of Arbitration as 
long as they are rationally connected with them. The introduction of this alternative criterion would 
have significant implications for the functioning of the PFTZ because companies registered inside 
the PFTZ, unless subject to an express prohibition under the Framework Plan,169 have permission to 
operate their business outside the PFTZ. If a dispute arises as a result of an activity that takes place                                                         
163 Adjudication Committee of the Supreme People’s Court, ‘最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国涉外民事关
系法律适用法》若干问题的解释（一）[No 24] (Supreme People’s Court’s Several Explanations on “Laws on Civil 
Matters Concerning Foreign Parties”)’ (10 December 2012) art 1.  
164 ibid. 
165 ibid. 
166 Shanghai International Arbitration Rules (2014) art 3. 
167 Huang Jie, ‘Legislation and Perfection of Applicable Laws of China’s Laws Concerning Foreign Civil Relations (中
国涉外民事关系法律适用法的制定与完善)’ (2011) 29(3) Tribune of Political Science and Law 4. 
168 Liu Shan Shan, ‘A Study on the Technical Aspect of Laws on Civil Matters Concerning Foreign Parties (《涉外民
事关系法律适用法》立法技术问题探析)’ (2011) 15(4) Cards World: Economics and Law 91.  
169  Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, ‘中国（上海）自由贸易试验区投资办事常见问题  (Common 
Questions on Investment inside the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone)’ (2013) 
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outside the PFTZ, on the basis of the geographical connection criterion alone, it would likely come 
before the local court near which the company in question operates its business instead of the PFTZ 
Court or the PFTZ Court of Arbitration, even when the company is registered in the PFTZ. The 
same outcome would apply to investments and transactions that involve intangible property, for 
example, the establishment of an online marketplace or the development of new technology by a 
company inside the Applicable Areas. The property itself is, obviously, not geographically 
connected with any location, let alone those areas. Yet, the property is rationally connected with the 
Applicable Areas since the collective free trade area enabled its creation by precisely the kind of 
business that they aim to attract, foreign investment. It would be absurd for any of these matters not 
to come before the PFTZ Court or PFTZ Court of Arbitration and not to benefit from special 
treatment merely because they cannot display a geographical connection. 
 
An interpretation of the Justiciability Rules or the Arbitration Rule 2014 by reference to the LFCR 
is inappropriate. In order to decide the justiciability of cases that come before the PFTZ Court or 
PFTZ Court of Arbitration, their causes of action should accord with the categorisation regulations 
of the Supreme People’s Court.170 The rational connection of the cause of action with the PFTZ 
should be the dominant criterion to decide whether the PFTZ Court or PFTZ Court of Arbitration 
can hear a case, particularly when intangible property is in question. Geographical connection 
should remain a complementary criterion when tangible property is in question, for example, in 
relation to disputes concerning real estate inside the Applicable Areas or disputes between a PFTZ 
company and its employees. The present, equivocal definition of jurisdiction is inadequate and 
specific criteria for justiciability are necessary. And if the authority formally adopts such an 
analogical interpretation of the rules, it would further face potential disputes deriving from 
ambiguous concepts such as the ‘Pudong New Area’s economic development’ or  ‘reform of the 
government systems’.171 Given that both the PFTZ and the Pudong New Area are still undergoing 
significant developments, it is likely that the meaning of such rules would vary from time to time. 
Therefore, it is essential that the authorities exercise their competence to set out guidelines or 
procedures for the courts to decide whether a case should be accepted, for example, by 
consolidating cases that have been previously accepted. 
 
4.2. Enact the Negative List and the Decision as Laws 
 
Since the uncertain legal status of the Negative List and Decision can cause disputes between PFTZ 
investors and the PRC, confirmation of the validity of these legal instruments is urgently necessary. 
Otherwise, the Negative List, as a ND, and the Decision, as a defective piece of authorised 
legislation, may have their validity become the subject of disputes even if these disputes actually 
concern the content, not the validity of the legal instruments. In a worst-case scenario, PFTZ 
investors may not even be able to bring disputes concerning the Negative List under the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law. Therefore, these legal instruments should receive due 
recognition as laws, that is, the authorities should republish them in compliance with the 
requirements of the Legislation Law. The PRC may refer, for assistance, to similar laws in other 
jurisdictions, for example, the United States and Singapore. In 1934, the United States enacted the 
Foreign-Trade Zones Act, which establishes review procedures for administrative decisions.172 In 
1969, Singapore enacted the Free Trade Zones Act, which contains a mechanism for the review of 
administrative decisions.173 Now that the PFTZ has been in operation for over three years, the time 
is opportune for either the NPC or SCNPC to reinforce the legal framework of the PFTZ through a                                                         
170 Supreme People’s Court, ‘最高人民法院关于印发《民事案件案由规定》的通知 [No 11] (Supreme People’s 
Court’s Notice on Issuing the Regulations on Categorization of Civil Cases)’ (1 April 2008). 
171 Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (n 96). 
172 Foreign-Trade Zones Act, art 81r. 
173 Free Trade Zones Act, art 13(2). 
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coherent set of laws and not an unsystematic array of legal instruments to avoid further disputes 
related to legal status and to enable reviewability by courts.  
 
4.3. Reform of the PFTZ Dispute Settlement Mechanism  
 
Even though the Management Method allows PFTZ investors to initiate administrative litigation 
proceedings, their right to have disputes come before the PFTZ Court is in question since this court 
contravenes the judiciary laws of the PRC. As the court of what is a free trade area, the PFTZ 
Court’s main responsibility is to handle the various matters that the business of PFTZ investors 
naturally brings up. However, under the Supreme People’s Court’s regulation, only intermediate or 
higher courts can conduct the hearing of administrative cases concerning ‘international business 
transactions’.174 This procedural requirement is applicable to all administrative review cases that 
involve international trade, for example, the sale and purchase of goods, services, or intangible 
property such as intellectual property.175 Therefore, as a ‘basic court’,176 the PFTZ Court cannot 
handle the kind of administrative disputes that arise out of foreign investment activities since most 
administrative decisions by the PFTZ Management Committee involve elements of international 
business transactions, such as the approval of foreign ventures inside the PFTZ.177 The rules of civil 
procedure compel the adjudication of these administrative disputes by the Shanghai No 1 
Intermediate Peoples’ Court together, of course, with any other matters that arise out of activities 
outside the PFTZ, this restriction makes the efficient management of PFTZ cases impossible and 
deprives the PFTZ Court of any practical use. 
 
The dispute settlement mechanism under the Management Method needs substantial reform before 
it can provide real assistance to PFTZ investors. However, the PFTZ should not only rely on the 
administrative review and litigation mechanisms of the PRC. It should also offer arbitration as an 
alternative settlement mechanism for disputes between PFTZ investors and PFTZ authorities such 
as the Management Committee in the interest of greater operational efficiency and flexibility.  
Disputes between foreign investors and the state have become very common with the proliferation 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in recent years. In order to ensure an efficient management 
of these disputes, most BITs contain a clause that provides for arbitration either with the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or under the rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 178 an option which is already 
available to PFTZ investors should they choose arbitration for the settlement of private-private 
disputes.179 
 
Arbitration is in high demand by foreign investors everywhere in the PRC, especially by those who 
are not familiar with the country’s civil litigation proceedings. Foreign investors tend to have more 
confidence in ICSID, UNCITRAL and such other alternative conflict resolution mechanisms than in 
the courts of a country that is notorious for its lack of judicial independence.180 ICSID, in particular, 
is able to offer an effective ‘alternative to the courts and administrative tribunals of the host                                                         
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state’,181 since, unlike UNCITRAL awards, ICSID awards are, generally, not appealable182 before 
the domestic courts. ICSID creates a self-contained international system, albeit controversially 
subject to ad hoc annulment committees. 
 
Some international investment actors may question the use of arbitration in handling investor-state 
disputes. In 2011, for example, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade announced 
that the Australian Government would no longer insert ‘investor-state dispute resolution 
procedures’183 in its new BITs. The impetus184 behind this drastic change of practice came from a 
challenge by Philip Morris to the Australian Government’s restriction on tobacco packaging, a 
challenge that the American cigarette and tobacco company made through the arbitration 
mechanism in the BIT between Australia and Hong Kong. Philip Morris initiated arbitral 
proceedings against the Australian Government on the grounds that the legislation amounts to an 
‘expropriation’185 of the company’s investment ‘due to the substantial deprivation of the intellectual 
property and goodwill’.186 Even though the arbitration tribunal eventually declared that it had no 
jurisdiction to hear the claim,187 the Australian Government remains concerned that investor-state 
arbitration clauses could risk the implementation of public policy. However, such a risk can be 
offset by the incorporation of certain contractual clauses, such as a ‘general exception provision’188 
in the style of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which provides 
that the host state’s implementation of policy ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health’ 189  shall prevail over the compliance of its treaty obligations. Such provisions are not 
uncommon and similar clauses have been adopted in many BITs, such as Colombia-Japan,190 
Canada-Thailand,191 Canada-Jordan,192 and even in some of the earliest BITs of the PRC, for 
example New Zealand-China.193 The insertion of these clauses is likely to protect host states from 
potential challenges to their domestic policies and would, therefore, neutralise any potential threat 
to national policies if the PFTZ were to adopt arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.   
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An investor-state arbitration mechanism for the PFTZ would be comparable to other domestic 
investment laws in which the State consents to arbitrate certain categories of disputes. Thus, if it is 
to adopt an investor-state arbitration mechanism, the PRC needs to provide the necessary legal 
framework – through domestic legislation for local courts to enforce either ICSID or UNCITRAL 
awards – rather than enter into BITs (and other investment treaties), which require reciprocal 
endorsement. Reciprocity is a principle inherent to BITs, where one state offers ‘the subjects of the 
other certain privileges on the condition that its subjects enjoy similar privileges in the other 
state’.194 Given that the PFTZ operates as a scheme to liberalise domestic trade and to attract 
foreign investors, BITs would be neither a feasible nor desirable mechanism through which to adopt 
an investor-state arbitration mechanism. An investor-state arbitration mechanism for the PFTZ 
would not rely on any reciprocal arrangement but on domestic legislation. 
 
Thus, domestic legislation would be required for PRC courts to enforce either ICSID or 
UNCITRAL awards. Although the PRC became a party to the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) in 1986195 and a party to 
ICSID in 1993,196 a study of the relevant domestic legislation reveals that these seemingly similar 
awards enjoy vastly different legal status in the legal system of the PRC. For years, a school of 
thought has argued that treaties are ‘directly applicable 197  in the PRC under the doctrine of 
‘adoption’.198 Adoption dispenses a state with the need to enact specific legislation to ‘transform’199 
the treaties into domestic laws. In other words, treaties form part of the state’s domestic legal 
framework upon signature. On this argument, parties should be able to enforce their awards in 
accordance with the Civil Procedural Law, which provides that parties can apply to ‘intermediate 
people’s courts’200 for ‘recognition and enforcement’201 of the award under ICSID or the New York 
Convention. However, the doctrine of adoption is not consistent with the PRC’s current approach to 
the implementation of international agreements. Generally, a ‘reference’ 202  to the treaty is 
necessary, either in the form of notices or interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court,203 
which carry ‘legislative’204 effect. Thus, in 1987, the Supreme People’s Court issued a notice by 
which it stipulated that the New York Convention would enter into force in the PRC on 22 April 
1987.205 Additionally, it provided an outline for the application of an arbitral award pursuant to the 
New York Convention. First, it set out the list of requirements206 for intermediate people’s courts to 
accept an arbitral award. Secondly, it gave full effect to the New York Convention by confirming                                                         
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its supremacy over the domestic laws should any ‘conflicts’207 between them arise. This notice 
continues to reassure foreign parties that they can enforce their UNCITRAL awards208 in the PRC. 
 
However, there have been no similar notices or interpretations issued by the NPC, SCNPC, or 
Supreme People’s Court on the application of ICSID. Although the PRC is a party to ICSID, 
signature of the convention alone cannot give full effect to an ICSID award. The PRC, as a member 
state, is under an obligation to devise ‘legislative or other measures’209 to ensure that an ICSID 
award is treated as ‘binding’210 and is enforced ‘as if it were a final judgment of a court in that 
State’.211 Therefore, the enforceability of ICSID awards still hinges on the recognition of ICSID by 
the PRC through legislative action. To think that ICSID applies automatically, without more, would 
be an incorrect assumption. Furthermore, under the doctrine of ‘Three Supremes’, the sovereignty 
of the Central Government prevails 212  over its international law obligations and, thus, the 
impossibility of an unrestricted and unregulated application of treaties inside the PRC regardless of 
its inconsistencies with domestic laws. Therefore, even though the Civil Procedural Law states that 
‘applicable international agreements’213 prevail over domestic laws, whether a treaty is deemed to 
be applicable without any relevant domestic legislation remains a highly uncertain question. 
 
Even if the PFTZ were to provide for UNCITRAL arbitration instead of ICSID arbitration, further 
legislation and clarification would be necessary to enable the enforcement of UNCITRAL awards 
regarding investor-state disputes. Further to the notice by the Supreme People’s Court, the New 
York Convention applies only to disputes between private investors and is, therefore, not applicable 
to ‘investor-state disputes’.214 Hence, despite the formal recognition of the New York Convention’s 
effect in the PRC, this express prohibition means that, when it comes to investor-state disputes, 
foreign parties with UNCITRAL awards are likely to be in the same predicament as parties with 
ICSD awards. Furthermore, it is possible for the people’s court to refuse to enforce an arbitral 
award if it is in the opinion that it is not in line with the ‘social and public interest’.215 This power is 
also embodied in the New York Convention, which states that the recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitral award may be refused if it is ‘contrary to public policy’216 of the country. However, 
given that what constitutes a contravention of social and public interest is an inherently equivocal 
concept, parties to an arbitration have to be aware of the uncertainty that would surround the 
enforcement of their arbitral awards. Thus, in order to establish an effective arbitral investor-state 
dispute settlement mechanism either in accordance with ICSID or the UNCITRAL rules, the 
Central Government should issue the requisite legal instruments to give effect to these conventions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Through an interpretative analysis of the legal instruments that regulate the functioning of the PFTZ 
– the Framework Plan, the Negative List, the Decision, the Management Method – this article has 
shown that legal uncertainty can cause investor-state disputes between PFTZ investors and the 
PRC, for example, the court’s reviewability of the Negative List. As a solution to the problem of 
legal uncertainty, the article has proposed, first, the adoption of rational connection to the PFTZ as                                                         
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the test for jurisdiction of the PFTZ Court and the PFTZ Court of Arbitration respectively; 
secondly, the enactment of the Negative List and the Decision as laws in order to clarify their legal 
status; and, thirdly, a reform of the PFTZ dispute settlement mechanism under the Management 
Method into an arbitral system. These proposals should minimise ambiguities in the interpretation 
of PFTZ laws, enhance the efficiency of the PFTZ Court and PFTZ Court of Arbitration, and ensure 
PFTZ investors an effective legal mechanism for the settlement of their disputes with the PRC. 
Undoubtedly, these proposals demand significant legal amendments, likely difficult to implement. 
However, these amendments should lay a solid legal foundation for the sustainable development of 
the PFTZ and other free trade zones currently developing in the PRC with the assurance that they 
would be rigorously monitored since they would only apply inside the PFTZ. 
 
The real problems, however, are those whose solutions would imply changes that would affect the 
whole country, such as the establishment of an effective international arbitration mechanism in 
accordance with the conventions that the PRC has entered into. These changes would potentially 
affect the entire governance structure since they would affect the government’s degree of control 
over affairs involving both domestic and foreign parties. These changes raise a question that 
ultimately relates back to the sovereignty of the PRC, which has always held a supreme status 
above and regardless of changes in people and time. In the end, the question is whether the PRC is 
ready to give real effect to the ‘reform and opening-up’ 217 that it has promised in the PFTZ 
Framework Plan for the long-term development of the PFTZ and, more widely, the PRC. While the 
various recent notices218 of the State Council extending PFTZ policies beyond the PFTZ may be 
indicators of the PRC’s willingness to implement nationwide reforms, the extent of those reforms 
still awaits further clarification. Until then, the PFTZ and its investor-state dispute settlement 
system will remain an experiment, an uncertain experiment. 
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